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 In the current geopolitical atmosphere, China and the United States are often involved in 
conversations regarding spheres of influence. This power can be referred to as a country’s level 
of soft power, and it is becoming increasingly beneficial to invest in elements that increase it. 
The following research explores the connection between the level of development assistance that 
a donor country provides and shifts in public opinion. In this case, public opinion is being used 
as an abridged measure of soft power and the objective is to quantitatively demonstrate that more 
official development assistance equates to stronger soft power. In the twenty-first century, China 
has used much of its capital to invest in various development projects throughout Europe, Asia, 
and Latin America. Just as well, the United States has provided its own aid in the same regions, 
and recently reorganized the entire structure of its development aid agencies with the passing of 
the bipartisan bill known as the Build Act of 2018. The subsequent research focuses on two of 
these regions, the most of which is directed at Latin America and a following section on Africa. 
Latin America affords us excellent data and its geographic proximity makes it a critical area of 
study. Africa on the other hand, has been a huge area of interest for China and the raw materials 
contained within it make it a crucial investment. With these two superpowers fighting for global 
influence, policymakers need indicators that can provide them with a snapshot of how effective 
aid programs are. If a relationship can be proved, then perhaps such a marker can promote more 
effective aid and diplomacy, thereby increasing the soft power of the nation. This research found 
that there is no observable positive or negative relationship between our variables, even when 
accounting for time lag.  
Reviewed by: Sarah Clark, John A. Gans, Jr., Ph.D., Christina Lai, Sarah O’Byrne,Ph.D., Ph.D. 
Mark Stout, Ph.D. 
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It is no secret that China has invested a large number of its financial resources into 
various aid projects abroad, and it has captured the interest of international relations experts and 
policymakers alike. Just as well, the United States of America has recently ramped up its own 
efforts by creating a new aid agency at the head of its international development projects. 
Therefore, if two world superpower rivals are spending so much money on projects abroad and 
competing for influence, an analysis of the effects that these investments have would benefit 
international relations academia. This paper speculates that a positive shift in public opinion 
represents an increase in soft power and that such a change would specifically occur when a 
donor country supports development assistance projects in a recipient country because of their 
public benefit. A relationship between these variables could represent a path towards a simpler 
metric through which policymakers could evaluate the effectiveness of development assistance. 
In focusing on both Chinese and American official development assistance, this research hopes 
to answer the question: does an increase in the amount of development assistance offered by 
China or the United States correlate to a positive change in the recipient nation’s public opinion 
regarding the respective donor (as an expression of soft power)?  To test this question, I looked 
at the period beginning in 2008, when Chinese outward direct investment (ODI) doubled and 
signaled an aggressive initiative considering it was in the wake of a financial crisis.1 Using 
various datasets, I cross-referenced Chinese and American development commitments with 
corresponding public opinion surveys. 
 
 
1 USCC Staff Report. “Going Out: An Overview of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment.” U.S.-China 
Economic & Security Review Commission. Retrieved at 
https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/GoingOut.pdf. P.1. 
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I began with collecting as much information as possible regarding projects from China's 
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the United States newly formed International Development 
Finance Corporation (USIDFC) and USAID data as well. Each institution contained its hurdles 
for acquiring accurate information. For China, the country does not publish an official record of 
the exact amounts it is giving away in aid. Therefore, the data regarding these projects had to be 
tracked down individually and triangulated from multiple sources. Fortunately, various research 
groups have taken to documenting these development assistance projects in as much detail as 
possible. As for the efforts of the United States, it must catch up because USIDFC was created 
only in 2018, and only recently announced the commencement of operations. Even though it 
absorbed its predecessor OPIC, the United States is almost a decade behind China when it comes 
to improving its vehicles for international development assistance. These issues were not 
insurmountable, but the research featured in this paper will be greatly enhanced as more 
documentation becomes available on both institutions. On the dependent variable side, I used a 
collection of surveys taken throughout the period to note changes in how the public viewed these 
countries. The challenges experienced in this variable mostly consisted of trying to paint an 
accurate picture of public opinion across surveys asking slightly different questions. As we will 
see in the literature review section, there exists a myriad of articles on different countries' 
shifting attitudes towards China. However, these studies too, would be benefitted from a set 
series of repeated survey questions across a decade. Ultimately, this research wants to inform 
policymakers about the importance of development assistance, especially within the realm of 
expanding soft power. Everything, from trade, diplomacy, and defense, is subject to the local 
populace's attitudes towards their allies. 
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The significance of discovering such a relationship would illuminate just how secure the 
connection is between dollars spent on helping develop another country and the local's 
willingness to change their opinion on that donor. By testing shifts in public opinion towards 
donor countries, this data tracks the potential influence on public officials and policymakers for 
their regions. Knowing the positive and negative correlations with policies and the public applies 
to any government official trying to make an informed decision. 
Literature Review 
 
Soft Power: Its Current State, Future Considerations, and its Calculation 
` 
 Perhaps one of the most comprehensive annual reports on global soft power is “The Soft 
Power 30”, a publication that does its best to measure and capture the current international 
political temperature. The Soft Power 30 series seeks “to provide useful insights and practical 
guidance to identify and measure the sources of soft power,” with the even more useful goals of 
“bringing structure to the complexity of soft power’s diverse and numerous sources.”2 The 
author posits that as the world becomes more multipolar and interdependent, the machinations of 
power are shifting outwards toward the growing list of non-state actors affecting global affairs. 
Elements like globalization, technology, and climate change strain global governance structures 
and are interrupting nations’ ability to “cooperate and manage conflict.” The mood of the report 
is that the geopolitical climate is as tumultuous as ever, stating that “international affairs seem 
trapped in a period of confusion, disruption, and uncertainty” with multilateralism stalling 
amongst “zero-sum, nationalist-driven policies.”3 Despite such a bleak outlook, strategies to 
respond to this calcification of foreign policy have emerged, and they will need soft power.  
 
2 Jonathan Mcclory, “Introduction- Soft Power 30: A Global Ranking of Soft Power 2019,” Portland-facebook-USC 
Center on Public Diplomacy, accessed on February 27, 2020, p. 9 
3 Mcclory, “Introduction-Soft Power 30: A Global Ranking of Soft Power 2019, "p: 16 
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 The foreign policy response strategies to the current state of the global order can be put 
into three categories, according to the Soft Power 30 2019, and we will focus on two of them. 
The first response detailed is one of retrenchment, in which a country like the United States 
would “return to its historical norm of a grand strategy of defensive realism and off-shore 
balancing.”4 So rather than remaining a global hegemon, the U.S. would drawback its forces and 
refocus its efforts to be more on the homeland than trying to solve the problems of others. 
Stephen M. Walt, the foreign policy scholar whose work influenced this section of the report, 
noted that this should not equate to the "total disengagement" of the U.S. because the off-shore 
balancing piece of the strategy would require highly active diplomats.5 Concerning this paper, if 
one were to play out this strategy in practical terms, it would mean "a massive reduction in 
international commitments and development aid terms." However, this would force the U.S. to 
use more "noncoercive" means in soft power. While proponents of this strategy might like the 
fact that it encourages other regions to be more self-sufficient and regionally cooperative, such 
an approach would be in retrograde with recent bipartisan foreign policy efforts like the BUILD 
Act of 2018, which established the United States International Development Finance Corporation 
(USIDFC).  
 In short, the BUILD Act sought to revitalize America’s ability to transparently engage 
with local businesses in countries abroad by allotting even more money for development 
assistance and encouraging private investment. President Trump explained in the Reorganization 
Plan for the BUILD Act that the DFC will enhance the United States’ foreign policy toolkit by 
 
4 Mcclory, “Introduction-Soft Power 30- A Global Ranking of Soft Power 2019, "p: 17 
5 Stephen M. Walt, “The End of Hubris And the New Age of American Restraint,” Foreign Affairs, May 1, 2019, p: 




empowering disenfranchised groups in developing countries to cultivate healthy multilateral 
relationships.6 In the same document, it is also worth noting that he explicitly states that the DFC 
is a “robust alternative” to China’s more predatory model, and such a tone signals at least some 
attempts to expand foreign policy rather than retrench. Should the latter happen, perhaps the 
most optimistic outcome of this period would see smaller countries forming regional alliances to 
challenge China’s expansion because they can no longer solely depend on the U.S. Then, 
perhaps, when combined with America's judicious use of diplomacy, there could emerge a new 
avenue for influence with a newly formed regional alliance. The other strategy, which the author 
sees as "the most ambitious," involves an opposite approach that still.  
It is unfortunate that this final strategy offered, which is coined "expansive 
reinforcement," is idealistic. It would involve members of the international order to "double-
down on efforts to reinforce and promote liberalism and multilateralism" and combine "domestic 
and international efforts from leading nations."7 This would see nations investing in efforts “to 
encourage tolerance, media literacy, critical thinking, and respect for human rights.” This 
strategy could be seen as one that promotes the employment of soft power through the advocacy 
of things like "a stronger human rights agenda" and aiding "transitioning states to bring them in 
line with liberal principles." The inclusion of these strategies in this literature review is intended 
to give an idea of how soft power experts see its current status and potential problems affecting it 
in the future. While this research product is an excellent piece on soft power in the world, the 
most practical section explains their methodology for calculating a country's soft power capacity. 
 
6 President Trump, “USIDFC Reorganization Plan,” March 8, 2018, p. 1, 
https://www.dfc.gov/sites/default/files/2019-08/Shelby_Letter_USIDFC_Reorg_Plan_08032019.pdf 
7 Mcclory, “Introduction-Soft Power 30- A Global Ranking of Soft Power 2019, "p: 19 
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 The Soft Power 30 methodology for measuring soft power draws from the works of the 
esteemed and prolific soft power scholar Joseph S. Nye Jr., who created a framework he called 
the “soft power conversion process.”8 In this process exists what Nye deemed as the three 
primary sources of a country’s soft power: culture, political values, and foreign policy. From 
these three, the Soft Power 30 builds off of to create an index that “asses the resources of 
countries by combining both objective and subjective data.”9 The objective data consists of six 
categories, themselves sub-indices, which are: culture, education, engagement, digital, enterprise, 
and government. The other component, the subjective data, consists of polling data, which was 
acquired through a survey that tested "international perceptions of countries assessed according 
to the most common 'touch points' through which people interface with foreign countries."10 This 
way of quantifying a country's soft power is undoubtedly a tremendous asset to the general 
scholarship concerning international relations. Specific to the interests of this paper, however, is 
if the BUILD Act empowers U.S. foreign policy (with China as a foil) to the point that it affects 
public opinion abroad. 
Why Does China’s Investment in Infrastructure Boost Its Soft Power Capacity 
  China has focused on a unique aspect of investment by putting its resources into 
infrastructure elements that connect countries. Back in 2013, China announced the plan for a 
trans-continental passage linking China with Southeast Asia, South Asia, Central Asia, Russia, 
and Europe by land – and a 21st century Maritime Silk Road, a sea route connecting China's 
coastal regions with southeast and south Asia, the South Pacific, the Middle East, and Eastern 
 
8 Joseph S. Nye Jr., “The Future of Power,” 2011, New York: Public Affairs 
9 Mcclory, “Soft Power 30- Methodology,” p: 26 
10 Mcclory, “Soft Power 30- Methodology,” p: 28 
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Africa, all the way to Europe.11 The ensuing research carried out by groups like AIDDATA, 
focused on what the results of these development projects would be both economically and 
diplomatically for China, the United States, and the rest of the world. If we treat this investment 
as one that intends to cultivate soft power, then we should consider the evidence on why it might 
work. 
Given the implications of China's projects, it immediately drew the attention of various 
research institutions. The AIDDATA Research Lab at William & Mary has put out detailed 
analyses throughout the BRI's evolution aimed at its effects on diplomacy, economics, and 
security. In 2018, in Working Paper 64, the group investigated the concept of connective 
financing about Chinese infrastructure projects in developing countries and did a fantastic job of 
synthesizing existing research. They note in the beginning of their paper that "Western 
politicians and public intellectuals" are highly critical of China's "speed over quality" approach 
and their propensity to fund "white elephant projects."12 Despite such criticism, developing 
countries are still drawn to China’s offers, even with the risk, because they still have “unmet 
infrastructure financing needs” and cannot work with Western lenders who are reluctant  to fund 
“roads, bridges, railways, and ports.”13 The main concern with their research though, was to 
answer something yet determined, and that was "whether and to what extent Chinese 
development projects widen or narrow inequalities within low-income and middle-income 
countries."14 For those critical of China's efforts and suspicious of their real intent, it might be 
 
11 European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (ERBD). "Belt and Road Initiative." Retrieved at: 
https://www.ebrd.com/what-we-do/belt-and-road/overview.html 
12 Richard Bluhm, Axel Dreher, Andreas Fuchs, Bradley Parks, Austin Strange, Michael Tierney, “Working Paper 
64-Connective Financing: Chinese Infrastructure Projects and the Diffusion of Economic Activity in Developing 
Countries,” September 2018, AIDDATA, p. 5 
13 Bluhm, p. 5 
14 Bluhm, p. 5 
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concerning that they actually have some positive effects by diffusing economic benefits into the 
surrounding areas and consequently giving China more soft power leverage.   
This working paper draws from other research to explain that "economists and scientists 
have found that international development organizations do a poor job of targeting economically 
disadvantaged regions within countries" and that they even have a tendency only to put these 
projects in more affluent areas.15 What makes China unique, however, is that its projects focus 
on "connective infrastructure," and this has the effect of "increasing the mobility of goods, 
people, and capital," with the possibility of helping developing nations spread their economic 
growth to more locations than just city centers. To test "the effects of these projects on the spatial 
distribution of economic activity," the group created "an original dataset of geo-located Chinese 
Government-financed projects situated in 138 countries between 2000 and 2014." The results of 
their test were very positive in favor of China. Mainly, they were able to conclude that "Chinese-
financed connective infrastructure reduces spatial inequalities and accelerates the diffusion of 
economic activity across geographic space" and that this finding was "robust to a variety of 
sensitivity checks and perturbations." 16  
Foreign Aid: A Diplomatic and Development Tool 
Carol Lancaster's book Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, and Domestic 
Politics explores the nature, history, and application of foreign aid before concluding with a 
comparative analysis of five countries and their utilization of it in diplomacy. She breaks down 
the essential question of "why is aid given?" into questions of purpose that get at the heart of 
how various countries have employed foreign assistance. The section on the U.S. is especially 
 
15 Bluhm et al. p. 6 
16 Bluhm et al. p. 7 
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helpful for understanding how our country has historically used aid as a diplomatic tool in the 
fight against communism and later in the war on terrorism. 
For the time that her study focused on, aid was used for four purposes: diplomatic, 
developmental, humanitarian relief, and commercial purposes. With the United States, aid has 
been used to achieve diplomatic goals based on international security like, for example, to curb 
the spread of communism in the Cold War or even using foreign aid as encouragement for 
stability in the Middle East.17 When it came to using aid for developmental purposes, this too 
overlapped with diplomacy in that it propped up societies enough to prevent sliding towards 
communism or allowing terrorists to leverage social unrest in their favor. These are all concepts 
that fall into increasing a nation’s soft power because they reflect social values that are attractive 
to economically disadvantaged countries. In this case, by providing foreign aid, the United States 
is signaling that these programs are worth the investment because the recipients have value. 
Perhaps it is the more socially focused development aid that will give the United States an edge 
over China’s efforts.  
Another interesting angle that the author forwards is that of the reasoning behind the U.S. 
reinvigorated foreign aid programs in the twenty-first century, many of which had been cut in the 
1990s for budget reasons. Lancaster hoped that it indicated a return to the “dualism of diplomacy 
and development” which was a Cold War paradigm that had aid for allies fighting terrorists 
balanced against development aid, both serving diplomatic purposes.18 She believed that the rise 
of Christian right was having dramatic effects on policymakers willingness to allocate foreign 
aid. More and more attention was being paid to developing nations in poverty which was leading 
 
17 Carol Lancaster.”Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, and Domestic Policy.” (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2007), chap. 1, “Second, Defining Aid’s ‘Purposes’”, ebook 
18 Lancaster, chap. 3, “The New Century: Has Anything Changed?”  
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to constituents expressing more desire for foreign aid to those in need. Such values were (and 
still are not) at odds with those on the left, and foreign aid looked to be a bipartisan element of 
diplomacy. At the time, Lancaster believed that these political shifts were on the precipice of a 
fundamental change to U.S. politics, with development assistance as a central platform. 
Lancaster’s investigation and case study of foreign aid does a wonderful job of presenting 
the history and application of it in the various realms of statecraft. Her work shows that indeed 
foreign aid has pieces that fit into improving a country’s soft power by attracting them to the 
donor country.  
China’s History of Development Aid in Africa and How Socialism Affected It 
 Most of the current literature focuses on China’s twenty-first century development aid in 
Africa, but the nation has actually been providing assistance to the region for six decades.19 In 
Ideology and Relationality: Chinese Aid in Africa Revisited, the author considers the other side 
of Chinese development and explains that there is more to the story. Right from the beginning, 
the paper dislodges the notion that China is being predatory in Africa by pointing out that China 
has historical relationships there with longstanding aid commitments. The paper leans into the 
concept of relationality, which supports the idea that states’ social relationships define their 
rational actions.20 The main question the paper seeks to ask is: why did China give development 
assistance to Africa, even when it was very impoverished during the Mao era, and it hints at a 
deeper relationship despite western concerns. 
 This paper outright dismisses the notion that China is involved in sending “rogue aid” 
which is something that many policymakers and researchers believe true. In October of 2019, the 
 
19 Pippa Morgan. 2018. “Ideology and Relationality: Chinese Aid in Africa Revisited.” Asian Perspective 42, 207-
238. Retrieved at https://muse.jhu.edu/article/713819/pdf 
20 Morgan page 207 
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U.S. Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross spoke directly about China’s predatory lending to the 
IMF, saying “Their state-owned enterprises use Chinese materials and Chinese nationals to build 
projects with very little local content, and if defaults occur, they foreclose on those assets rather 
than renegotiating the loans.”21 Still though, the author claims that the quantitative and 
qualitative research shows that China does not disproportionately invest in land grabbing 
schemes, resources, or authoritarian regimes.22 Instead, he argues that the relationship between 
China and Africa can be expressed through relationality, which centers on achieving rational 
material gains using preexisting relationships.  
 This international relationship dynamic can be observed after the People’s Republic of 
China  (PRC) was formed in 1949. Despite being very feeble in its young age, the PRC 
recognized the power of forming relationships with other developing countries in Africa. Guided 
by ideology, Mao purposely sought out nations with similar ideals to provide assistance to. 
Furthermore, with relationalism in mind, these decades old relationships, like the ones with 
Zambia and Tanzania, actually affect China’s foreign aid allotments today. These state 
relationships were conditioned by the preexisting shared socialistic ideologies. Zambia and 
Tanzania are two of China’s oldest allies and actually contain a Mao era railway project known 
as the TAZARA railway.23 Even today, these two countries remain two of the largest ODA 
recipients from China, getting help in many crucial areas of health, education, transport, water 
supply, and agriculture. However, in the conclusion, the qualitative data featured in this analysis 
shows that the responses do not always positively correlate to traditional friendships, evidenced 
 
21 PK Semler, “Trump takes aim at China’s Belt and Road lending,” October 22, 2019, The Asia Times, 
https://asiatimes.com/2019/10/trump-takes-aim-at-chinas-belt-and-road-lending/ 
22 Morgan page 210 
23 Morgan page 226-227 
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by those a Zambian president running on anti-China platforms.24 While the countries may not 
always receive the aid well, the author was able to empirically prove that those countries with 
historic ideological ties to China continue to receive a disproportionate amount of aid compared 
to their other African neighbors. 
 This analysis has some interesting applications to our larger exploration of soft power 
and its ties to development assistance. On one hand, China continues to maintain strong 
influence over its historic allies in Africa and this supports the authors proposed focus on 
relationality as a framework for explaining real political maneuvers. It also admits that these 
traditional friendships do not always circumvent the political complexities of developing nations. 
Therefore, while the idea of framing international relations around traditional ties is not 
necessarily wrong, it does not always predict that a country will be shielded from other soft 
power influences solely because of differences in ideology. An analysis of these complexities 
would help to enhance this study because it is likely that corruption has caused disparities 
between elites and working classes, especially when China gives so generously. A 2018 study 
investigated local-level Chinese aid projects in Africa and it consistently found a correlation 
between these projects and increased corruption.25 However, the researchers found that it was not 
because of increased economic activity, but rather that the Chinese presence alone had 
influenced the local norms in a negative way.26 When using the same sort of calculations and 
data for World Bank aid projects, they did not find the same levels of increased corruption in 
Africa. Such research only helps to paint a clearer picture of what aid does on a local level, yet, 
 
24 Morgan page 230 
25 Ann-Sofie Isaksson & Andreas Kotsadam, “Chinese aid and local corruption,” Journal of Public Economics 159, 
146-159, Retrieved at https://www-sciencedirect-
com.proxy1.library.jhu.edu/science/article/pii/S0047272718300021#s0055 
26 Isaksson & Kotsadam page 157 
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when considered alongside the research presented in this paper, it only further highlights the 
need for consistent local surveys on public opinion. Just as well, it exemplifies an area of further 
study as local-level intricacies that could affect public opinion of China or the United States, 
even though such variables were not included in this study. 
 
 
Hypothesis and Methods 
 
In this research, we can expect to see a positive shift in a country's public opinion toward 
China or the United States that correlates to its level of official development assistance. This 
research hopes to test the real power of development assistance and its ability to influence public 
opinion as a measurement of soft power. The previous literature review section expressed that a 
crucial part of soft power is foreign policy, which in the case of this research is actualized 
through development assistance and aid. While cultural concepts are typically the most 
prominent pieces of soft power, the hypothesis featured here focused on development assistance 
with a country’s foreign policy as a vehicle for soft power. To test this hypothesis, I used a 
combination of data gathered from the USIDFC, USAID, AIDDATA, Latinobarometro, and 
Afrobarometer.  
The use of public opinion as a measurement of soft power was predicated on the belief 
that large flows of foreign investment into a country’s economy would have some effect on the 
locals attitudes towards the donor country. The conceptual connection would be that 
development aid would be hailed as a success by government officials and its products would 
help elevate local economies. The success or failure of these investments would then 
consequently be indicated by changes in public opinion. In China, African Union leaders 
constantly praise deals that the two have achieved together, as seen in the 2018 Forum on China-
 14 
Africa Cooperation. At the forum, almost fifty African presidents traveled to Beijing and spoke 
on the benefits of their partnerships with China, using a variety of descriptors, all of which were 
positive.27 However, China also has a tendency to send in its own workers, and even when it 
does hire locals, they are only in the lowest paid positions and placed under Chinese managers, 
with very few protected rights and often have to work in unsafe conditions.28 One potentially 
interesting outcome of this could be that a negative correlation exists between African’s public 
opinion of China and foreign development aid from them. As for China and Latin America, the 
actions of the Trump administration have encouraged many of them to give China more 
consideration. In the middle of 2019, President Trump finally actualized his threats to cut foreign 
aid to El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras citing shortcomings in their efforts to curb illegal 
immigration over the past years.29 These threats had encouraged leaders in the Community of 
Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) to see China as very constructive in their 
region.30 These high level, state actions and statements could reasonably be expected to influence 
how the public views another country. Therefore, this research feels that the flux and flow of 
billions of dollars in foreign aid assistance would affect its recipients’ opinions of the donors and 
be captured in public opinion polls. 
The methodology of testing this hypothesis involved sifting through the available public 
opinion polls concerning the two nations and looking closely at the overlapping periods where 
 
27 Abdi Latif Dahir, “ ‘Satisfied’ and ‘Inspired”: All the Ways African Leaders Praised their Alliance with China,” 
September 5, 2018, Quartz Africa, https://qz.com/africa/1379457/china-africa-summit-african-leaders-praise-
relations-with-beijing/ 
28 Socrates Mbamalu, “Plight of African Workers Under Chinese Employers,” September 27, 2018, African Liberty, 
https://www.africanliberty.org/2018/09/27/plight-of-african-workers-under-chinese-employers/ 
29 Lesley Wroughton and Patricia Zenegerle, “As Promised, Trump Slashes Aid to Central America over Migrants,” 
June 17, 2019, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-immigration-trump/as-promised-trump-slashes-aid-
to-central-america-over-migrants-idUSKCN1TI2C7 




China and the U.S. committed official development assistance (ODA). This research chose to 
focus more attention on Lain America because the quality of data in that region will allow for a 
better test of our hypothesis, as Latinobarometro performed consistent annual public opinion 
polls. Additionally, the data will include a slightly lesser exploration of Africa because China 
and the United States have invested in significant projects there. In Africa, the public 
assessments taken in previous years were much more limited and the questions were not repeated 
in subsequent surveys. The data will still be included though because there has been so much 
ODA activity in this region, but one can expect a much more accurate test of the hypothesis to be 
found in South America.  
Operationalizing public opinion and evaluating it allows us to quantify the outcomes of 
policy. Economic variables like imports, exports, GDP, and median household income would 
undoubtedly be useful measures of the impact of funding aid projects. However, by studying the 
data regarding public opinions, perhaps it represents a higher-level metanarrative to the effects of 
important policy in the 21st century. To reflect this element of soft power, the data was combined 
to give a country an “Opinion Score.” This metric is simply the total percentage of positive 
responses which were “very good” or “good” minus the total percentage of negative responses 
like “bad” or “very bad.” Such a score gives us an informative snapshot of increases or decreases 
in public opinion. With this information, we can quickly observe local opinions on how 
beneficial they believe these programs to be and possibly even more. Alongside the surveys, it is 
necessary to collect the information from the respective aid agencies in charge of delegating 
funds. 
For the United States, the methodology is looking at projects being funded by USAID, 
OPIC, and on through its evolution into the USIDFC (or just DFC). It should be noted that we 
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should expect to see a large amount of ODA projects on the U.S. side because of the level of 
detailed reporting, especially the data gathered through USAID. For China, tracking ODA is 
unfortunately not so easy, as they do not release any official record on this kind of assistance. 
Still though, the research intends to prove that countries willing to accept ODA would rationally 
develop an improved opinion of the donor countries willing to provide it. Therefore, with public 
opinion as the dependent variable, our dataset would ideally use the dollar amount of Chinese 
investment as the independent variable. The problem, as mentioned before, is that China does not 
release a country-by-country breakdown of this information. The solution to this problem lies in 
the datasets painstakingly developed by research groups like the College of William and Mary’s 
AIDDATA and Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies’ China-Africa 
Research Initiative (CARI). 
In the current situation, there exists a primary source gap in reporting exactly how much 
China is spending on development assistance projects and where that money is going. 
AIDDATA explains that “(China and other emerging donors) do not participate in existing 
global reporting systems” like the OECD’s Creditor Reporting System and the International Aid 
Transparency Initiative.31 To remediate this, the research lab has developed a system to track 
underreported financial flows, what they call their TUFF methodology. Although it is time-
consuming, TUFF "synthesizes and standardizes vast amounts of unstructured, project-level 
information from governments, international organizations, civil society groups, the private 
sector, journalists, and researchers." The data they obtain helps them track actors operating 
outside of the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC). Furthermore, for added 
context as to the scope of AIDDATA's research, these non-DAC donors are estimated to be 
 
31 "Tracking Underreported Financial Flows," AIDDATA, accessed February 26, 2020, 
https://www.aiddata.org/methods/tracking-underreported-financial-flows 
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typically offering between $11 billion to $41.7 billion in development assistance per year. 
Another similar research group is CARI at Johns Hopkins that focuses on China-Africa lending 
data since 2007 and utilizes many of the same exhaustive investigation methods as AIDDATA to 
arrive at a comprehensive dataset. For Africa alone, the total amount that “Chinese government, 
banks, and contractors extended was US $143 billion in loans to African governments and their 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs).”32 These high levels of spending in regions of interest warrant a 
closer look at its effects on China’s soft power in the region. In Africa, there exist many under-
utilized natural resources in countries that simply lack the means to capitalize on them. While in 
South America, any outside attempts to draw neighboring countries away from the U.S. 
necessitates serious evaluation because of economic and security concerns.   
This study opens up the door for connecting it to even more pointed, local studies how 
policymakers in countries receiving financial assistance responded to praise or criticism as the 
deals went into motion. Some exciting scenarios could arise from this exploration. Do countries 
that shift to a more positive view of China also become less intimidated by its military spending? 
Have some countries responded inversely because they see Chinese or American funded projects 
as invasive? Does the fact that the American model emphasizes a nation's sovereignty and 
supports the private industry with local workers have more of an impact? These are just some 
questions that could be pursued further than the scope of this current project. Going forward, we 
will consider the data in various case studies where there were significant changes to a nation's 
attitudes towards China or the United States. 
Data 
Data-South America-China ODA-like-flows 
 
32 “CARI Loan Data Overview,” CARI, accessed February 26, 2020, http://www.sais-cari.org/data 
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 To test our hypothesis linking public opinion to the amount of money invested by China, 
we can track some of the survey results put out by Latinbarometro. Starting in 2008, we can 
begin by tracking the survey question: "I would like to know your opinion about the following 
countries that I am going to read. Do you have a very good, good, bad, or very bad opinion of 
China?" The results of the 2008 to 2018 surveys can be seen below:   
 
Public Opinion Scores-South Americans on China 
  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Bolivia 48.6 63.3 56.6 59.4  42.5   43 43 49.4 32 
Brazil 33.7 30.8 50.5 37   39.6   39.5 44.7 48 52.7 
Colombia 56.2 63.6 62.6 50.8   19   31.3 50 70.5 57.6 
Chile 51.7 49.4 51.3 57.5   28.7   17.6 30.1 31.2 32.9 
Ecuador 44.8 39.4 67 53.4   44.3   28.4 53.4 35.1 40.6 
Peru 62.2 74.7 66.1 66.5   40.9   44.3 55.8 52.6 45.6 
Uruguay 49.1 47 55.8 41   49   30 45.8 54.7 62.9 
Venezuela 60 67.3 75 67   52.9   33.6 38.5 52 40.5 
 
When we cross-reference this data with that of the AIDDATA, we can see that in 2008, 
only Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru received official development assistance (ODA) like flows 
from China.33 Some project highlights are the $300,000 in flood relief to Colombia, $100,000 to 
help fund de-mining efforts in the Ecuador-Peru border region, and a cultural center that China 
built in Peru. The following year, here are the results of a survey asking the same question for 
those three countries: 
 2009   Very good Good Bad Very bad 
[%68%] 
Bolivia 900 11.7 70 15.8 2.6 
[%170%] 
Colombia 850 14.6 60.1 21.7 3.6 
 
33 AIDDATA-China ODA Like Flows 
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[%604%] 
Perú 917 14.1 73.3 10.5 2.2 
(N) 2.667 13.4 68 15.8 2.7 
 
In trying to account for time lag, we can even look at the following year, 2010, for these 
three countries to see if the soft power increase was only delayed: 
 2010   Very good Good Bad Very bad 
[%68%] 
Bolivia 797 11.8 66.5 17.3 4.4 
[%170%] 
Colombia 838 12.4 63.3 20.8 3.6 
[%604%] 
Perú 920 12.4 70.7 14.6 2.4 
(N) 2.555 12.2 66.9 17.5 3.4 
 
The results for 2009 show that both Bolivia and Peru's populations responded positively, 
while Colombia actually became slightly more polarized towards China, with respondents 
moving away from the middle options. However, there is a gap that needs to be accounted for, 
and that is the dollar amount of projects, like the cultural center built by China for Peru, that do 
not have a dollar amount associated with them. To calculate this here, we will just look at the 
number of projects in a country and see if it corresponds to shifts in public opinion. The table for 
China’s ODA projects in South America from 2008 to 2014 can be observed below: 
Chinese ODA Projects in South American Countries 
  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Bolivia 1 4   1 2     
Brazil       1       
Colombia 1 1 6 8   2 1 
Chile     2         
Ecuador   3       1   
Peru 5           1 
Uruguay   2 1 2     1 
Venezuela             1 
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Each number represents the number of projects that China committed to the 
corresponding country in the form of official development assistance. The next step is to build a 
similar table that reflects the percentage point change for the same years. To accomplish this, the 
survey data was compiled and the participants who gave an "I don't know" answer to the 
question were removed leaving us with four categories that are very good, good, bad, and very 
bad. It should be noted that the exclusion of “I don’t know” responses is not because it is 
insignificant, but rather because if there was a shift in soft power, the participant would move 
from this neutral category and on into a positive or negative group. Next, to consolidate the 
number even further, a score was created for each country's opinion that was simply the positive 
views minus the negative views. It should be noted that there is a gap in the survey data for 2012 
and 2014, so 2015 was included to show the attitudes at the end of the period being studied. One 
can see the countries' China opinion scores below: 
South American Public Opinion Score on China (Positive views - 
Negative views = Score) 
  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Bolivia 48.6 63.3 56.6 59.4   42.5   43 
Brazil 33.7 30.8 50.5 37   39.6   39.5 
Colombia 56.2 63.6 62.6 50.8   19   31.3 
Chile 51.7 49.4 51.3 57.5   28.7   17.6 
Ecuador 44.8 39.4 67 53.4   44.3   28.4 
Peru 62.2 74.7 66.1 66.5   40.9   44.3 
Uruguay 49.1 47 55.8 41   49   30 
Venezuela 60 67.3 75 67   52.9   33.6 
 
 As we will discuss further in the following section of this paper, there does not seem to 
be a strong correlation between the number of development projects China begins and the South 
American public opinion of China.  
Data-Africa-China ODA-like-flows 
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 As referenced before, according to CARI, China has pumped at least $143 billion dollars 
into African projects alone since 2007. Given the high volume of countries in Africa, this 
research would ideally focus on the top ten African countries that China invests in. According to 
the Brookings Institute, they are: Nigeria, Angola, Ethiopia, Kenya, Zambia, South Africa, 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Congo, Cameroon, and Mozambique.34 The problem is that 
the group seems to have run the surveys somewhat sporadically and excluded a few key 
countries necessary for our research. For the sake of consistency, we will try to structure the data 
the same for both sections. For the survey data, we will use information gathered by the research 
group at Afrobarometer, which is a “non-partisan, pan-African research institution conducting 
public attitude surveys on democracy, governance, the economy and society in 30+countries 
repeated on a regular cycle.”35  
As mentioned before, the data expressed here would have significantly benefitted from 
surveys with more systematic and consistent questions. For example, back in 2008, 
Afrobaromter sent out a public opinion survey that asked, "In your opinion, how much do each 
of the following do to help your country, or have not you heard enough to say? China." Their 
questions reached six of the ten countries that China invests the most in, and they were: Kenya, 
Mozambique, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, and Zambia. Here the answer data needs to be 
adjusted into positive and negative categories. Given that the choices were "do nothing, no help," 
"help a little bit," "help somewhat," and "help a lot," we are going to assume that the first two 
would fall on the negative side and the last two as positives. If we perform the same kind of 
scoring as we did with the South America data, it comes out as below:  
 
34 Mariama Sow, “Figures of the Week: Chinese Investment in Africa,” The Brookings Institute: Africa in Focus, 
September 6, 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2018/09/06/figures-of-the-week-chinese-
investment-in-africa/#:~:text= 
35 “About Afrobarometer,” Afrobaromter, accessed February 26, 2020, https://www.afrobarometer.org/about 
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African Public Opinion Scores on China 







Nigeria 10       
Kenya 28       
Zambia 52       
South Africa -13       
Mozambique 42       
Tanzania 18       
 
Further research revealed that the Pew Research center put out a survey in 2013 that 
contained eight African countries, three of which (South Africa, Kenya, and Nigeria) are within 
our scope. The question asked is one that would have been profoundly helpful to this research if 
it had been consistently polled. It asked, "It is most important to have strong ties with China or 
the U.S. (or both)?"36 If we were to score opinions in favor of strong ties with China as a positive 
and those in line with the U.S. as a negative, and counting those who said both as neutral, then 
we could arrive at the following scores for China in 2013:  
African Public Opinion Scores on China 
  2008-2009 2010-2011 2012-2013 2014-2015 
Nigeria 10    20  
Kenya 28    -5  
Zambia 52      
South Africa -13    -10  
Mozambique 42      
 
Finally, the survey data from the 2014-2015 is the most pertinent to testing our 
hypothesis because the question was “In general, do you think that China’s economic influence 
 




on [country question was asked in] is mostly positive, or mostly negative, or haven’t you heard 
enough to say?” By accounting for the positives and negatives, as well as disregarding the “don’t 
know” and “neutral” answers, we arrive at our scores.  
African Public Opinion Scores on China 







Nigeria 10    20 60 
Kenya 28    -5 68 
Zambia 52     62 
South Africa -13    -10 31 
Mozambique 42     56 
Tanzania 18     55 
 
It is evident that these survey comparison conditions are not ideal, but they do show a 
significant shift in the local sentiment towards China. Now, if we compare this with the 
AIDDATA (shown below), we can see how many ODA projects were implemented and how it 
correlates to our data. 
Chinese ODA Projects in African Countries (By Year) 
  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Nigeria   1   1 15 3 2 
Kenya 16 12 23 11 6 14 6 
Zambia   10 12 5 4 1 34 
South Africa   1       1   
Mozambique   3 5 2 4 8 1 
Tanzania 94 8 68 10 11 15 6 
 
 So while we will discuss it in more detail in a subsequent section, it does not appear that 
official development assistance alone can be used as an indicator of how public opinion will 
change. Now, we will look at what the data says about the United States, and its ODA flows 
abroad.  
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Data-South America-United States ODA-like-flows through USAID and the USIDFC 
 When we looked at China in the previous section concerning its development assistance 
in South America, we had no primary sources to indicate how much ODA was being given out 
and to whom it was going. However, with the United States, we have access to a wealth of data 
from USAID, OPIC and the newly formed USIDFC have had any effect on public opinion (as a 
barometer for regional soft power). For USAID, we will treat each individual line item of ODA 
as a project, similar to what we did for China. When combined with the information on DFC 
projects (including those from OPIC), we have the following table shows the number of 
combined projects implemented in a year for the respective country:  
 
USAID and USIDFC Projects in South America 
  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Bolivia 174 132 83 71 63 116 23 14 17 2 4 
Brazil 77 89 87 89 54 53 46 40 31 42 39 
Colombia 57 94 135 129 182 227 226 206 179 181 243 
Chile 0 0 9 4 1 8 4 7 9 5 3 
Ecuador 112 116 98 103 55 90 82 54 40 16 16 
Peru 180 136 172 145 92 154 154 196 175 166 189 
Uruguay 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Venezuela 23 18 20 15 26 45 29 45 28 30 49 
 
It should be noted here that the data range was extended in an attempt to capture any 
recent development assistance programs that might have been started to counter China directly. 
However, as we will discuss later, this table compares the same list of countries that China has 
invested in, and the lack of programs in recent years could be in line with policy shifts. Just as 
well, we should look at what the public opinion scores of the United States was during these 
years.  
Public Opinion Scores-South Americans on the United States 
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  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Bolivia 2.5 41.1 36.4 41.4   13.6   13.1 34.3 5.6 4.7 
Brazil 25.4 59.1 61.6 59   66.2   59.9 71.2 58.9 56.2 
Colombia 32.4 72.7 68.7 50.6   41.6   31 61.2 63.3 50.9 
Chile 53.6 69 71.7 68.8   59.7   56.8 65.6 64.5 55.9 
Ecuador 45.5 63.7 81.8 67.2   64.6   66.4 72.3 72.3 66.8 
Peru 40.8 64.2 67.1 65.5   57.8   60.5 75.2 51.2 28.4 
Uruguay -0.6 64 53.2 22.4   42.9   46.3 52.3 22 19.6 
Venezuela -10 40.6 35.8 20.8   23.6   13.7 36.4 25 30.4 
 
 Again and unfortunately, if we use the previous table as a signal for where public 
opinions should be shifting, there does not seem to be any consistent correlation. However, as 
noted before, it might be a part of the grander strategy not to begin ODA projects where China 
already has a strong foothold.  
Data-Africa-US ODA Like Flows 
 As was similar to the data in the China section, acquiring consistent African public 
opinion data for the United States was challenging. The surveys for the United States were 
inconsistent and suffered from poor coverage on some of the countries this research would prefer 
to focus on. If we follow the structure of our opinion scores that Africans gave China, our table 
can only be completed as follows: 
African Public Opinion Scores on US 







Nigeria 26       
Kenya 65       
Zambia 48       
South Africa -4       
Mozambique 46       
Tanzania 55       
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 These public opinion scores will require supplemental information in order to gauge the 
local public’s perception of the United States. We will use the same survey question from 2012-
2013 that we did for China previously, but this time we have to subtract those in favor of 
stronger ties with China from those who prefer the United States. The table now looks like this:  
African Public Opinion Scores on US 







Nigeria 26    -20   
Kenya 65    5   
Zambia 48       
South Africa -4    10   
Mozambique 46       
Tanzania 55       
 
 
 Additionally, for the 2014 and 2015 year, a survey polled countries in Africa on the 
question, “In your opinion, which of the following countries if any would be the best model for 
the future development of our country?” Again, if we treat votes in favor of the United States as 
a positive, and those for China as a negative, then our table will look like this: 
African Public Opinion Scores on US 







Nigeria 26    -20  19 
Kenya 65    5  25 
Zambia 48      -8 
South Africa -4    10  10 
Mozambique 46      -21 
Tanzania 55     -5 
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 Although it is not a very high-resolution study on public opinion, despite the gaps, this 
does give us a number to at least compare against China’s scores. For our final piece of data, we 
can use the USAID and DFC’s database of ODA projects in Africa to acquire the number of 
projects taking place.37 The table below shows the number of projects listed from the year 2008 
and on until 2016. 
USAID and USIDFC Projects in Africa 
  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Nigeria 234 262 275 148 234 206 265 282 288 303 313 
Kenya 247 224 301 286 290 386 424 327 349 351 236 
Zambia 135 195 110 127 218 185 188 186 183 148 154 
South Africa 142 177 152 113 134 174 176 158 170 185 155 
Mozambique 212 184 131 173 162 180 211 171 193 217 168 
Tanzania 206 204 177 230 220 216 297 234 191 213 173 
 
 With this last piece of data organized, now we can discuss and interpret it. 
 
Discussion 
 In collecting this data, the research forwarded here hoped to find a clear and significant 
demonstration of increased development assistance producing an increase in either the United 
States' or China's soft power. In this case, the data measured soft power as the public opinion of 
the countries receiving official development assistance. Public opinion surveys were given a 
score, which consisted of positive views minus the negative views. 
 The most reliable data came from the countries in South America because they have a much 
more normalized polling structure. Public opinion data for the United States and China was easy 
 
37 “All Active Projects,” Development Finance Corporation, accessed at https://www.dfc.gov/our-impact/all-active-
projects 
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to acquire and document, as was the data for ODA flowing into these countries. We will begin 
our evaluation with South America because of the data consistency and availability.  
 Starting with an analysis of the information on China, we have a pretty good snapshot of 
public opinions of the country in South America alongside the ODA projects being implemented. 
South American Public Opinion Score on China (Positive views - 
Negative views = Score) 
  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Bolivia 48.6 63.3 56.6 59.4   42.5   43 
Brazil 33.7 30.8 50.5 37   39.6   39.5 
Colombia 56.2 63.6 62.6 50.8   19   31.3 
Chile 51.7 49.4 51.3 57.5   28.7   17.6 
Ecuador 44.8 39.4 67 53.4   44.3   28.4 
Peru 62.2 74.7 66.1 66.5   40.9   44.3 
Uruguay 49.1 47 55.8 41   49   30 
Venezuela 60 67.3 75 67   52.9   33.6 
 
China ODA Projects in South American Countries 
  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Bolivia 1 4   1 2     
Brazil       1       
Colombia 1 1 6 8   2 1 
Chile     2         
Ecuador   3       1   
Peru 5           1 
Uruguay   2 1 2     1 
Venezuela             1 
 
Starting with Bolivia, we can see that in 2009, with a score of 63.3, China committed four 
specific projects to the country for development. With such a large influx, we should expect to 
see a positive change in the following year. However, this was not the case, and public opinion 
fell 6.7 points in 2010. It could be possible that because of the delayed benefits of aid projects, 
then there might also be a delay in positive increases to public opinion. Still, per the data, it does 
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not appear to be the case here. The most striking example from our sample countries here would 
be from Colombia. China gave them the most consistent amount of attention, and public opinion 
still plummeted. While there were some positive relationships like in Brazil, Chile, and Ecuador, 
the expectation with development projects would be that the increase in soft power would be 
more stable and long-lasting. This was not the case with China, so maybe it will be different for 
America. 
  
South American Public Opinion Scores on the United States 
  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Bolivia 2.5 41.1 36.4 41.4   13.6   13.1 34.3 5.6 4.7 
Brazil 25.4 59.1 61.6 59   66.2   59.9 71.2 58.9 56.2 
Colombia 32.4 72.7 68.7 50.6   41.6   31 61.2 63.3 50.9 
Chile 53.6 69 71.7 68.8   59.7   56.8 65.6 64.5 55.9 
Ecuador 45.5 63.7 81.8 67.2   64.6   66.4 72.3 72.3 66.8 
Peru 40.8 64.2 67.1 65.5   57.8   60.5 75.2 51.2 28.4 
Uruguay -0.6 64 53.2 22.4   42.9   46.3 52.3 22 19.6 
Venezuela -10 40.6 35.8 20.8   23.6   13.7 36.4 25 30.4 
 
USAID and USIDFC Projects in South America 
  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Bolivia 174 132 83 71 63 116 23 14 17 2 4 
Brazil 77 89 87 89 54 53 46 40 31 42 39 
Colombia 57 94 135 129 182 227 226 206 179 181 243 
Chile 0 0 9 4 1 8 4 7 9 5 3 
Ecuador 112 116 98 103 55 90 82 54 40 16 16 
Peru 180 136 172 145 92 154 154 196 175 166 189 
Uruguay 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Venezuela 23 18 20 15 26 45 29 45 28 30 49 
 
 The number of projects started by the United States in South America is far greater than 
China’s commitments and that offers us some good data to analyze. For Brazil during this 
period, 2008 through 2011 had a steady rise, but then in 2012, the aid starts to decline. In 
Colombia, there is a steady increase that still continues today and when compared to the surveys, 
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does not appear to have affected it significantly. The same can be said for the country of Peru, 
which saw consistent investment and hardly any relationship between our two variables, even 
declining to by half from 2017-2018. Now, let us look at the data regarding soft power in Africa. 
African Public Opinion Scores on China 







Nigeria 10    20 60 
Kenya 28    -5 68 
Zambia 52     62 
South Africa -13    -10 31 
Mozambique 42     56 
Tanzania 18     55 
  
Chinese ODA Projects in African Countries (By Year) 
  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Nigeria   1   1 15 3 2 
Kenya 16 12 23 11 6 14 6 
Zambia   10 12 5 4 1 34 
South Africa   1       1   
Mozambique   3 5 2 4 8 1 
Tanzania 94 8 68 10 11 15 6 
 
 For this discussion, it should be emphasized that the survey data here is not very 
consistent. For each set of years that were used to determine China’s public opinion score, the 
survey question was different. In an attempt to provide a similar scoring system across the scope 
of years observed, essentially, all votes in the negative for China were then subtracted from the 
total positive votes. Still, we can draw some similar conclusions to the South American study in 
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that there is no strong correlation with public opinion and the number of ODA projects being 
started.  In Kenya, which saw annually high amounts of projects still had their public opinion 
score of China drop over a few years. Even in Zambia, which had thirty-four new ODA items 
from China in 2014 alone, it only saw an increase of ten points in six years. Then if we look at 
the United States, we will find similar inconsistencies. 
African Public Opinion Scores on US 







Nigeria 26    -20  19 
Kenya 65    5  25 
Zambia 48      -8 
South Africa -4    10  10 
Mozambique 46      -21 
Tanzania 55     -5 
     
 
USAID and USIDFC Projects in Africa 
  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Nigeria 234 262 275 148 234 206 265 282 288 303 313 
Kenya 247 224 301 286 290 386 424 327 349 351 236 
Zambia 135 195 110 127 218 185 188 186 183 148 154 
South Africa 142 177 152 113 134 174 176 158 170 185 155 
Mozambique 212 184 131 173 162 180 211 171 193 217 168 
Tanzania 206 204 177 230 220 216 297 234 191 213 173 
 
 
Unfortunately, here again, there does not seem to be any reliable evidence that the 
number of projects sanctioned by the United States will affect increases or decreases in favorable 
public opinion. This conclusion is unfortunate because foreign aid has been effectively used for 
development and diplomacy, as demonstrated in Carol Lancaster’s work. Just as well, 
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policymakers would universally benefit from having a scoring system that captures the 
effectiveness of certain types of aid. If it were so easily conveyed, they would be able to have a 
more unified vision of how to direct foreign aid policy. The research makes it clear that 
investments in aid projects, like those in the infrastructure sector, have positive effects on even 
rural communities as it allows them to participate in the economy more. However, you need 
good data to get the most conclusive results possible.  
The survey data on this continent is the weakest between the two, and this is problematic 
because policymakers would benefit from knowledge on the shifting influence dynamic 
happening in Africa, where China is investing a large number of its efforts into projects that 
overshadow those of the United States. The evidence of China’s deep African historical alliances 
and the benefits of its projects there, shown earlier in the literature review section, highlight the 
need for a structured annual survey of the countries on the African continent. Acquiring this 
information would help to better correlate soft power with the efforts of donor countries because 
the gaps in the available data do not rule out a relationship. Although, the results did not prove 
the hypothesis, they do represent a basic framework for explaining to policymakers how more 
aid dollars spent does not equal support for the United States. 
Despite not proving a correlation, this study is useful to policymakers for proving that 
prior to making generous aid donations abroad, there are more variables to consider for the 
optimum foreign policy outcome. Should the research presented in this study be combined or 
built into one that has more local level data, United States foreign policy stands to benefit 
tremendously. This data would allow the research with higher resolution which could illuminate 




 The conclusion with this research in its current state is that even with consistent surveys 
and ODA data, there is no significant correlation between shifts in public opinion (as a measure 
of soft power) and the amount of development assistance they receive. This paper attempted to 
demonstrate a simple metric for policymakers to use as an indicator for areas of additional 
interest when considering future foreign development assistance projects. The problem is not 
with public opinion as a measurement of soft power. Publications like the Soft Power 30 have 
consistently shown that the global balance of soft power moves in line with public opinion, 
alongside other factors like events and policies.38 However, the simple act of committing 
development assistance to another country does not cleanly show that the citizens of the recipient 
countries see this as a net benefit. Even when assuming that projects would take time, there is not 
any significant indication of a soft power increase lag concerning aid projects. Still, though, the 
research could be modified some changes to increase the overall accuracy and resolution of the 
data points. 
If China would provide the dollar amounts of its commitments to the development 
projects abroad, then perhaps one could arrive at much more insightful conclusions about the 
market and soft power. Public opinion still seems to be a good indicator of soft power, but cross-
referencing it with shifts and changes in the dollar amount is imperative. It is highly unfortunate 
that the public opinion surveys out of Africa are poorly employed, especially since most of the 
emerging economies being invested in by the United States and China would benefit from better 
analysis. Ideally, this research would have reached conclusions that made gauging project 
effectiveness more concise.  
 
38 Mcclory, “Conclusion and Look Ahead-Soft Power 30: A Global Ranking of Soft Power 2019, "p: 115 
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  Given that the United States and China are competing superpowers with very different 
ideologies, one of the expected outcomes was that an increase in the public opinion score of one 
might lead to decreases in the score of the other. That was not the case, and often a drop in the 
public opinion score of one would also be seen in the other. The hypothesis for this research was 
predicated on the belief that if two world superpowers were giving so much attention to foreign 
development assistance, one could expect to see the public respond accordingly. Such a change 
in influence would then also represent a good measure of the effective increase or decrease of a 
country’s soft power.  
  The USIDFC, USAID and Chinese foreign development institutions seek to fund projects 
that should better the livelihoods of locals in that area. Even if China intends to put poorer 
countries into a debt trap, the locals should see benefits, and one would expect this to be 
expressed through positive changes in public perception. If America funds projects that will be 
completed by local workforces and benefit members of that area, then one would expect people 
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